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I 
THE LAWYER'S DUTY TO REPORT 
ANOTHER LAWYER'S UNETHICAL 
VIOLATIONS IN THE WAKE 
OF HIMMEL 
Ronald D. Rotunda • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ethics of lawyers have been very much in the news in recent 
years, as several major law firms have settled, for substantial sums, vari-
ous malpractice claims based on ethical violations. New York City's 
Rogers & Wells, for example, settled, for $40 million, a case in which it 
continued to represent a client after it should have known that the client 
was perpetrating a fraud. 1 Chicago's Winston & Strawn settled, for ap-
proximately $7.3 million, a lawsuit involving allegedly reckless advice it 
had given on securities law2 Baltimore's Venable, Baetjer & Howard 
had to pay $27 million when it settled a lawsuit involving conflicts of 
interest3 These are hardly nuisance settlements. 
The lawyers for Ivan Boesky-the prestigious law firm of Fried, 
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (Fried, Frank)-now find themselves 
as codefendants in an investors lawsuit brought against Boesky. Fried, 
Frank had prepared the private placement memorandum and had writ-
ten legal opinions for Boesky. Judge Milton Pollack rejected defendants' 
motions to dismiss the complaint based on their arguments involving, 
inter alia, the substantiality of the alleged participation, the loss causa-
tion of the transactions pleaded, and the losses claimed to have oc-
curred! Sullivan & Cromwell has been challenged for the fifth time in 
recent years on the grounds that its conduct in a case may have been 
unethical; the trial judge, in a precedent-setting decision, approved a tern-
* Professor of Law, University of illinois. A.B. 1967, Harvard University; J.D. 1970, Harvard 
Law School. The author thanks Professors 0. Fred Harris and Thomas D. Morgan for reading the 
manuscript and offering suggestions. They, of course, are not responsible for any errors that may 
remain. 
The author is further indebted to the research support provided through the generosity ofli Ross 
and Helen Workman, who have funded the Workman Research Grants of the University of Illinois 
College of Law. 
1. See After A $40M Payment, It's Not Over Yerfor Rogers & Wells, Nat'! L.J., Apr. 14, 1986, 
at 1, col. 1. 
2. See Winston & Strawn to Pay $7.3M in Pact, Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1987, at 3, col. 1. 
3. See Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, Nat'! L.J., May 25, 1987, at 3, col. 1. 
4. Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 87 Civ. 1865 (MP) (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1987). 
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porary restraining order barring a tender offer because of alleged con-
flicts of interest involving Sullivan & Cromwell. 5 
Yet malpractice suits and motions for disqualification are not the 
only way-nor are they supposed to be the primary way-to enforce the 
minimum ethics of the legal profession. In modern times, state courts 
have established attorney discipline systems to enforce the rules gov-
erning the minimum standards for lawyers.6 Thus, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has established the Attorney Registration and Discipline Commis-
sion, often called, after its initial letters, the ARDC. The Illinois 
Supreme Court has also adopted rules governing lawyers7 Although the 
legislature has not enacted these rules, they are still law in the same way, 
for example, that court-promulgated rules of civil procedure are law. 
Until almost the beginning of this century there were no codes of 
ethics for lawyers.8 Various nineteenth-century commentators discussed 
attitudes among lawyers regarding ethics, and some even published their 
own proposals recommending how lawyers should behave. 9 But there 
was no official, written, regulatory code. In fact, throughout the entire 
last century' it was very unusual that a lawyer would ever be disci-
plined. 10 If lawyers engaged in particularly outrageous conduct before 
the court, a local judge might impose some sort of discipline, even disbar-
ment, but the judge based such discipline not on any promulgated code 
but on what the courts referred to as the inherent power of the judiciary 
to regulate the lawyers practicing before it. 11 Lawyers, proclaimed the 
5. Cohen, Sullivan & Cromwell Faces Challenge Over Role in Electrolux Bid for Murray, Wall 
St. J., May 16, 1988, at 8, cols. l-2 (midwest ed.). Jonathan Lerner, a partner with Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flam commented: "I'm aware of no other situation in which an alleged conflict by 
a lawyer has been the basis for an injunction against a tender offer." ld. at 8, col. l. 
Subsequently, Skadden, Arps found itself in the middle of an ethics charge involving its tactics 
on behalf of Coastal Corp. in its takeover battle against Texas Eastern Corp. "The legal tangle, 
which has raised eyebrows and reddened faces in the closely knit world of takeover attorneys, in-
volves secret court filings that opposing counsel didn't know about [and] admittedly false stat'ements 
made by attorneys in court .... " Cohen, Texas Eastem-Coastal Battle Spurs QueStions on Conduct 
of Skadden, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1989, at B7, cols. 1-2 (midwest ed.). 
6. ~From 1978 to 1982, there has beeil a 73% increase in sanctions. McPike & Harrison, The 
True Story on Lawyer Discipline, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 92. 
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, art. VIII (1987). 
8. Alabama, influenced by the works of Judge Sharswood and David Hoffman, see infra note 
9, was the first state to publish a Code of Legal Ethics. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420 (1978). 
9. See D. HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in COURSE OF 
LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (1836); G. SHARSWOOD, AN EsSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1860). 
10. See, e.g., R. PoUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 184-85, 242-48 
(1953). 
11. E.g,, Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 53! (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (a court's discipli-
nary power is "incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the 
respectability of the profession"); cf Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694 (N.C. 1987) 
(state supreme court upholds plan requiring each lawyer to pay $50 each into a client security fund; 
this opinion extensively discusses the "inherent power" of courts over attorneys). 
. Needless to say, some of the early discipline actions do not comport with modern notions of due 
process. Gressman, Inherent Judicial Power and Disciplinary Due Process, 18 SETON HALL L REv. 
541, 542-46 (1988); cf Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883); id. at 290-318 (Field, J., dissenting). I 
I 
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judges, are "officers of the court." 12 
Not until 1908, at the thirty-first annual meeting of the American 
Bar Association, did that organization adopt anything resembling a code 
of ethics. The document was entitled the "Canons of Professional Eth-
ics," and its preamble emphasized that it was not really a code of law but 
only "a general guide," 13 not at all intended to be definitive. The Ca-
nons' "numeration of particular duties should not be construed as a de-
nial of the existence of other equally imperative, though not specifically 
mentioned" duties. 14 
It is fair to say that, while there has not been an extensive conspir-
acy of silence among lawyers, 15 many lawyers in fact are reluctant to sue 
their fellow lawyers and, naturally, also disinclined to report them to the 
disciplinary authorities. 16 Thus, it is interesting that as early as 1908 the 
American Bar Association supported, in somewhat generic terms, a duty 
to report. Canon 29 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the first ABA 
code, is entitled "Upholding the Honor of the Profession." Canon 29 
provided that "lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the 
proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and 
should accept without hesitation employment against a member of the 
Bar who has wronged his c!ient." 17 
It is easier for the organized bar to agree that there is such a duty 
than to enforce it. Over sixty years after the ABA promulgated its Ca-
nons, an ABA special committee, chaired by former United States 
Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, concluded that lawyers' and judges' 
reluctance to report attorney misconduct was a major problem with at-
torney discipline. 18 Nonetheless, the ABA, at the turn of the century, set 
the stage by endorsing an attorney's obligation to report professional 
miscond net. 
The general public and the average lawyer probably did not really 
expect this primitive code of ethics to be the basis for statutory rules 
12. Gaethe, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989). 
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Preamble (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. Ro-
TUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 412 (1989). 
14. Id. 
15. An attorney's belief in a "code of silence" that would prevent him Jrom answering ques-
tions regarding his knowledge of another attorney's misconduct is evidence that he is not "fit to 
practice law." In re Anglin, 122 IlL 2d 531, 539, 524 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1988). 
16. Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Professional: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SuF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 66, 100-0l (1974); Marks & Cathcart, Di"sCip!in"e Within the Legal Profession: Is It 
Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. LF. 193, 207; Hill, The Bar at Bay: Malpractice Woes Hit Attorneys 
as Lawsuits Against Them Increase, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1976, at I, 26, cols. 1-2 (eastern ed.). 
17. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908), reprinted in T. MORGAN & R. Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 13, at 420; see also id. at Canon 28 ("A duty to the public and to the profession 
devolves upon every member of the Bar having-knowledge of (improper solicitation] to immediately 
inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred."). 
18. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DlSCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 167 (1970); see alfo supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
980 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW (Vol. 1988 
imposing legal discipline on lawyers. 19 Most of the sections are written 
in rather quaint and vague terms, 20 homilies of an earlier era. 21 Such 
nebulous language is not like statutory language at all.22 Nonetheless, 
after the Canons were published, the courts, when confronted with a law-
yer's conduct that they viewed as improper, would often cite these ABA 
Canons (or local bar association canons, derived from the ABA Canons) 
as evidence of lawyers' ethical obligations. 23 Although the ABA Canons 
had not been enacted into law by court rule or legislative action, judges 
perhaps believed that it would be prudent to refer to some authority for 
their actions other than merely the court's inherent power. Often that 
other authority was the American Bar Association's Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics. 
On August 12, 1969, the American Bar Association's House of Del-
egates adopted an entirely new code, then called the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. It was written in much more statutory terms, 
with black letter requirements called "Disciplinary Rules" (DRs). This 
code made very clear that its Disciplinary Rules set a minimum standard 
below which a lawyer could not fa!J.24 Strong evidence that the Ameri-
can Bar Association clearly intended its new code was to be not merely 
self-edifying but binding was its accompanying statement: the Code was 
"adopted" on August 12, 1969 by the ABA House of Delegates "to be-
come effective for American Bar Association members on January I, 
1970."25 Years later, in an atmosphere where the Department of Justice 
had brought antitrust charges against the ABA, 26 the ABA changed the 
title of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.27 No longer did the ABA speak of this Model 
19. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986). 
20. The Canons were based on the model of a $Olo practitioner usually engaging in litigation, 
that is, in litigation that is straightforward, not complex multiparty litigation. Its successor, the 
MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970), shares this same mind-set. See G. HAZ-
ARD, Ennes IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7, 16-18 (1978). 
21. Stone, The Public Influence ofrhe Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. I, 10 (1934). 
22. E.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 2 (1908) ("The aspiration of lawyers for 
judicial position should be governed by an impartial estimate of their ability to add honor to the 
office and not by a desire for the distinction the position may bring to themselves."). 
23. E.g., Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957) 
(citing ABA's CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1937)), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
966 (!958). 
24. E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBlLJTY DR l-J02(A)(l) (1980); see '0/So 
id. Preliminary Statement ("The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which 
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."). 
25. This statement is reprinted in V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FlNMAN, & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAW-
YER IN MODERN SOCIETY 889 n.* (2d ed. 1976). 
26. See Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suir Again:~t the ABA, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538 (1978) 
where the Justice Department memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss its antitrust suit 
against the ABA without prejudice because of change in circumstances and the increase in competi· 
tion is reprinted. The Government filed its suit on June 25, 1976, and dismissed it on August 30, 
1978. 
27. See ABA Corum. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420 (1978). 
The title of this informal opinion is: "Purpose and Intended Effect of the American Bar Association 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Opinions of the Ethics Committee." The ABA ethics 
I 
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Code as binding on its members. 
This new ABA code set out not only discipline standards, below 
which a lawyer may not go, but also aspirational standards expressed in 
what were called "Ethical Considerations." The very first version of the 
ABA Model Code-it was amended periodically until 1981 and, in 1983, 
replaced by the new ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct28-pro-
vided a whistle-blowing role for lawyers similar to that found in the ear-
lier Canons of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the Model Code 
made clear that this duty to report is not merely an aspirational one but 
one of discipline. Disciplinary Rule I-103(A) provides, "A lawyer pos-
sessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report 
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority in power to investigate 
or act upon such violation." 
The cross reference to "DR 1-102'' indicates the breadth of there-
porting obligation. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 is entitled "Misconduct" 
and it provides a lawyer shall not "[ v ]iolate a disciplinary rule," or "cir-
cumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another," or engage in 
"illegal conduct involving moral turpitude," or any conduct "involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."29 In addition, Discipli-
nary Rule 1-102 has two other broad-brushed prohibitions: a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct "prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice"30 or "any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to 
practice law. " 31 
Illinois, like almost all other states, has followed the lead of the 
ABA Model Code and imposed a whistle-blowing rule for its lawyers. 
However, the Illinois cross-references are more specific and more care-
fully drafted than ABA Disciplinary Rule 1-103 from which the Illinois 
rule is derived. Illinois Rule 1-!03(a) provides that a lawyer "possessing 
unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule l-102(a)(3) or (4) shall 
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority in power to inves-
committee published this informal opinion on June 5, 1978, shortly before the Department of Justice 
dismissed its antitrust case against the ABA. See Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suit Against 
the ABA, supra note 26. 
The Informal Opinion took pains to emphasize: 
Other than serving as a model or derivative source, the American Bar Association Code of 
Professional Responsibility plays .no part in the disciplinary proceeding, except as a guide for 
consideration in the adoption of local applicable rules for the regulation of conduct on the part 
of legal practitioners .. 
At one time the American Bar Association membership application form contained a state-
ment to the effect that the member would abide by the American Bar Association canons of 
ethics and later by the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. 
(T]his statement on the application form ceased to have any meaning long before it was belat-
edly removed by the Board of Governors in 1976. 
28. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on Au-
gust 2, 1983. Because they were "model" rules, they had no effective date. About half of the states 
have adopted the new Model Rules. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-4 (Dec. 21, 
1988). 
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBJLJTY DR 1-102(A)(l)·(4) (1980). 
30. Id. DR 1-102 (A)(5). 
· 31. Jd. DR 1-102(A)(6). 
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tigate or act upon such violation."32 Subsection (a)(3) of Illinois Rule 1-
102, in turn, states that a lawyer should not engage in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude, and subsection (a)(4) says that the lawyer 
should not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. 
The Illinois rule regarding whistle blowing is not unusual. What is 
unusual is its enforcement. While there are lawyers who take seriously 
their ethical obligations to report the violations of other lawyers, it is 
unusual to find the bar authorities enforcing this rule. If we look through 
all of the courts of this land, it is virtually unheard of to find a case where 
a lawyer is disciplined merely for refusing to report another lawyer.33 
We can find cases where lawyers are disciplined under the state rule cor-
responding to ABA Disciplinary Rule l-103(A), but a close reading of 
these cases shows that the lawyer also did something else wrong. In 
those cases where the lawyer was disciplined for failing to report another 
lawyer, the failure to report was merely one of several discipline viola-
tions, with the bar authorities or the court throwing in the failure to 
report as one violation among many. 34 
That is, until Himmel. 35 
H. THE HIMMEL CASE 
The Himmel case is very significant. H is the first case in which a 
lawyer is charged with nothing except failing to report another lawyer's 
misconduct, under circumstances in which the client specifically told her 
lawyer not to report the other lawyer's misconduct. Attorneys have 
greeted Himmel with surprise. 36 The Illinois Supreme Court did not 
treat Mr. Himmel's violation lightly; it disciplined this solo practitioner 
by suspending him for one year. 
Let us hriefiy look at the facts of Himmel. The beginnings of the 
case stretch back more than a decade. In October 1978, after one 
Tammy Forsberg had been injured in a motorcycle accident, she retained 
an attorney named John R. Casey to represent her. Casey worked out a 
settlement of $35,000, one-third to go to him and two-thirds to Ms. For-
sberg. However, when Casey received the $35,000 settlement check, he 
converted the funds. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to collect her share of over 
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, Rule l-l03(a) (1987) (emphasis added). 
33. R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESI'ONSJBJLITY 31 (2d ed. 1988). 
34. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d 1336 (1981) (attorney dis-
barred for failing to report and aiding unethical conduct of his law firm); Matter of Bonafield, 75 
N.J. 490, 383 A.2d 1143 (1978) (attorney disciplined for failing to report another and for aiding 
another attorney's unethical conduct). 
35. In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988). 
36. Harlan, Illinois Decision Muddles Attorney-Client Privilege, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1989, at Bl, 
cols. 5-6 (midwest ed.); Middleton, Illinois Bar Is Jarred by "Snitch" Case, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, 
at 3, 23. 
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$23,000, Ms. Forsberg hired James H. Himmel to represent her. He of-
fered not to collect any fees until she had recovered her full $23,233.34; 
he would then collect only one-third of any funds recovered in excess of 
that amount. After Himmel entered the case, Casey agreed to pay For-
sberg $75,000 in settlement of all claims she might have against him in-
cluding, presumably, any claims· for punitive damages. 37 Under the 
settlement agreement, Ms. Forsberg agreed not to initiate any criminal, 
civil, or disciplinary action against Casey. 38 Casey, it seems, did not 
honor this agreement, and so Himmel, on behalf of his client, sued Casey 
and won a judgment of $100,000. Himmel was never able to collect all of 
this award, but because of Himmel's efforts, Ms. Forsberg eventually col-
lected a total of $15,400 from Casey. Himmel therefore received no fee 
for his efforts because, pursuant to his agreement with Ms. Forsberg, the 
amount was less than the full amount owed her. 
Neither before nor after the $100,000 judgment against Casey did 
Himmel report Casey to the disciplinary authorities, because Forsberg 
had specifically instructed him not to take any other action. She said she 
simply wanted her money back. She may have wanted to do nothing that 
might be construed as desiring revenge. Also, Ms. Forsberg may have 
been concerned that by having her attorney report Casey she wonld raise 
the stakes in their dispute and make it that much more difficult to collect 
any money from Casey. 39 
On January 22, 1986, a few months after Ms. Forsberg's judgment 
against Casey, the ARDC began formal disciplinary proceedings against 
Himmel, for failing to report Casey. 
Apparently Ms. Forsberg, prior to retaining Himmel, had contacted 
the ARDC. Whether she actually reported Casey to the ARDC was a 
matter of some dispute. The Review Board (the intermediate appellate 
authority for the ARDC), over the objections of the ARDC, specifically 
found that Ms. Forsberg had complained to the ARDC about Casey 
prior to hiring Himmel. Presumably, she had turned to the lawyers in 
the ARDC in her efforts to secure their aid in recovering from Casey the 
money that he had converted from her. Following that attempt, she re-
tained Himmel. The Review Board specifically found that Ms. Forsberg 
had contacted the ARDC prior to hiring Himmel and that therefore the 
37. This agreement occurred in April 1983. 125 Ill. 2d at 535-36, 533 N.E.2d at 791. 
38. Perhaps a portion of the $75,000 settlement represented "hush money," i.e., an amount 
paid in consideration of not initiating any criminal or discipline action against Casey. See infra note 
44. Himmel, however, probably thought of the extra amount as akin to treble damages. Telephone 
conversation with ARDC spokesperson (Mar. 31, 1989). Ms. Forsberg was on a motorcycle that 
was struck by a Corvette that went through a stop sign. Ms. Forsberg suffered a concussion, was in 
the hospital for about a month, was in a cast for many more months, and had $20,000 to $25,000 in 
medical bills alone. Transcript of Disciplinary Proceeding at 12-17, In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 
533 N.E.2d 790 (1988) (No. 86, ch. 24). This evidence suggests that Casey probably settled Ms. 
Forsberg's personal injury claim too cheaply. 
39. Cf Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 449, 521 P.2d 858, 866 ("It is not unreasonable 
for a disgruntled client to attempt to resolve his differences with an attorney through a civil action 
before filing a Complaint with the State Bar."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). 
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ARDC "did have knowledge of the alleged misconduct [by Casey]."40 
The ARDC disputed the finding of the Review Board that it had 
actually learned about Casey from Ms. Forsberg's initial complaint. The 
Illinois Supreme Court did not disturb this finding and assumed it to be 
correct. In fact, the court found this factual issue irrelevant to its hold-
ing. "The question is," the court said, "whether or not respondent vio-
lated the Code, not whether Forsberg informed the [Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary] Commission of Casey's misconduct."41 
The ARDC apparently learned of Casey because of various other 
complaints against him brought by additional clients also harmed by 
Casey's violations of his ethical obligations. During April 1985, the 
ARDC administrator petitioned to have Casey suspended because of his 
"conversion of client funds and his conduct involving moral turpitude in 
matters unrelated to Forsberg's claim."42 On November 5, 1985, Casey 
was disbarred on consent." On January 22, 1986, the ARDC turned its 
attention to Mr. Himmel and filed a complaint before the Hearing Board. 
The Hearing Board concluded that Himmel had received "un-
privileged information" about Casey's violations and therefore should 
have reported his actions to the disciplinary authorities. However, be-
cause Himmel had practiced law for eleven years, had no prior record of 
any complaints, and did not even receive a fee for recovering what money 
he could for Ms. Forsberg, the' Hearing Board (the initial disciplinary 
authority of the ARDC) said that it recommended only a private 
reprimand. 
The administrator of the ARDC appealed that decision to the Re-
view Board. On this level the ARDC was even less successful, for the 
Review Board recommended that the complaint be dismissed. First, the 
Review Board concluded that the disciplinary authorities already had 
knowledge of Casey's problem, from Ms. Forsberg herself. Second, it 
noted that Ms. Forsberg had specifically instructed Himmel not to report 
Casey to the disciplinary authorities or to anybody else. 
Then, the administrator of the ARDC filed before the Illinois 
Supreme Court a petition for leave to file exceptions. He argued, among 
other things, that there was misconduct in failing to inform the discipli-
nary commission of Casey's conversion of Ms. Forsberg's funds and that 
this conduct warranted at least a censure under the law. The Illinois 
Supreme Court responded by imposing a much more severe sanction: it 
suspended Himmel for one year44 
40. 125 IlL 2d at 537, 533 N.E.2d at 792. An independent review of the transcript indicates 
that the Review Board finding that Ms. Forsberg had effectively reported Casey to the ARDC is 
against the weight of the evidence. 
41. Id. at 538, 533 N.E.2d at 792. 
42. Jd. at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791 (emphasis added). 
4). Id. 
44. When the Illinois Supreme Court turned to wha1 it called the "quantum of discipline" to 
be imposed on Himmel, the court expressed a great deal of concern that Himmel drafted a settle~ 
ment agreement between his client and Casey in April1983, and this settlement provided that "For-
No.4] LAWYER'S DUTY TO REPORT 985 
A. The Quantum of Evidence Needed 
On its face, the whistle-blowing rule in canon 1 of the Illinois Code 
of Professional Responsibility applies to all disciplinable violations 
within its terms, whether they are, in the reporting lawyer's view, fla-
grant and substantial, or minor and technical. However, an element of 
judgment remains because lawyers need not (though they may) report 
suspected violations that are not clear violations of the disciplinary rules. 
In this case, allegations regarding Casey's conduct, if true, constituted a 
clear and serious violation of the relevant disciplinary rules. Indeed, in 
this case, the facts regarding Casey's conduct were not in dispute. The 
Illinois Supreme Court does not really discuss this issue in any detail, but 
the point seems clear enough. 
What if the evidence regarding Casey's conduct were more ambigu-
ous? The Illinois Supreme Court does not directly analyze this question, 
but its discussion supports the view that the duty to report is a function 
of the nature of the offense (for example, conduct involving dishonesty) 
and of the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. The fact 
that the lawyer who is being reported may deny the charge against him 
does not relieve the reporting lawyer of the obligation to blow the whis-
tle. There was eventually a civil judgment against Casey, but Casey ap-
parently did not simply admit guilt and turn over the money when 
Himmel presented him with Ms. Forsberg's claim. Recall that even the 
Review Board referred to Casey's "alleged misconduct."45 
Typically, the reporting rule does not require that the quantum of 
evidence of which the lawyer is aware be beyond dispute. After all, the 
sberg agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary action against Casey." Id. 
(emphasis added). The court stated at the end of its opinion: "We are particul~rly disturbed by the 
fact that respondent chose to draft a settlement agreement with Casey rather than report his miscon-
duct. As the Administrator has stated, by this conduct, both respondent and his client ran afoul of 
the Criminal Code's prohibition against compounding a crime. ." Id. at 545, 533 N.E.2d at 796. 
The court then quoted from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, TI 32-1 (1987). The 1961 committee comments 
to this section state: "There is no intent to prohibit a victim of theft or other property offense taking 
steps to recover his property, so long as such action does not involve, as consideration for such 
recovery, a promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosecution." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, ,! 32-1 
committee comment (Smith-Hurd 1977). 
In contrast to the Illinois law, the Model Penal Code § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
("Theft by Extortion") provides that one: 
is guilty of theft if he obtains property of another by threatening to . . accuse anyone of a 
criminal offense; or . . cause an official to take or withhold action . However, it is an 
affirmative defense that the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit or 
other invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for 
harm done . 
Note that Casey breached the April 1983 settlement agreement. Consequently, Mr. Himmel 
did not continue to fail to report Casey because of that agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court made 
clear that its reliance on the Illinois Criminal Code was only to determine the degree of the sanction 
against Himmel, not the decision whether there should be any sanction. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 545, 
533 N.E.2d at 796. 
Oddly enough, the Illinois court never cited Illinois Rule 7..:105, providing that: "A lawyer shall 
not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges to obtain an advantage 
in a civil matter." 
45. See sUpra text accompanying note 40. 
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reporting rule refers to "knowledge" of a violation of a disciplinary rule 
It does not require "certainty." The lawyer's knowledge may not go un 
challenged. If "knowledge" were interpreted in its existential sens< 
rather than its practical sense, the reporting requirement would be l 
nullity. 46 
On the other hand, there is no mandatory obligation to report men 
rumor or suspicion. The ABA Model Code does not specifically define 
"knowledge." But, by analogy, the Model Rules define "[k]nowingly," 
"[k)nown," or "[k]nows" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question"; 
"[r]easonable belief" or "[r]easonably believes" means "that the lawyer 
believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that 
the belief is reasonable."47 The Model Rules explain that a "person's 
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."48 
In other words, at some point the lawyer's investigation and study of 
the client's charges will convince her that the allegations involving the 
other lawyer's misconduct are serious and substantial; that these allega-
tions pertain to illegal conduct involving moral turpitude or conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation within the 
meaning of Illinois Rules 1-102 and l-103; and that the evidence of such 
conduct is substantial enough that the lawyer has "knowledge." Within 
a reasonable time thereafter, the lawyer must report this knowledge if it 
is unprivileged. The Illinois Supreme Court did not focus on this inter-
pretation of the rules but rather centered its discussion on the main ques-
tion before it: did Himmel have "unprivileged" knowledge of a 
violation? 
B. The Definition of Unprivileged Information 
The most critical issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was 
whether Himmel's knowledge of Casey's violation of Illinois Rule 1-
102(a)(3) or (4) was "unprivileged." 
The Illinois Supreme Court explicitly asserts that, in interpreting its 
own reporting rule, it finds "instructive" the ethics opinions of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, because the Illinois rules "essentially track the lan-
guage" of the ABA's Model Code.49 In the course of its opinion, the 
court emphasized this point by citing such an opinion. 50 In this respect 
the Illinois Supreme Court has done what many other state and federal 
courts have done in the past; there is nothing unusual about referring to 
the work product of the ABA Ethics Committee. What is unusual is that 
Himmel never referred to how the American Bar Association interprets 
46. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in ASsisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 672 (1981); Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491. 
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology, paras. [5J, (8] (1983). 
48. Jd. at para. [5]. 
49. 125 Ill. 2d at 540, 533 N.E.2d at 793. 
50. !d. at 540-41, 533 N.E.2d at 793 (citing and discussing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility. Informal Op. 1210 (1972)). 
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the term "privileged information." In particular, the Himmel court 
never even cited ABA Formal Opinion 341, interpreting "privileged" to 
mean "those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by 
DR 4-101." 51 Nor did the court cite the Opinion of the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Association holding that 
when DR 1-103 requires a lawyer to report "unprivileged knowledge" of 
another lawyer's misconduct, "unprivileged" means information that is 
not a confidence or secret under Canon 4. 52 
The Illinois court, in determining what "privileged" meant, as-
sumed that "privilege" referred only to the law of evidence. The court 
cited and relied on Professor Wigmore's classic definition of when the 
privilege is lost-the evidentiary privilege was never a favorite of Wig-
more's, and he always interpreted it narrowly-and concluded that there 
was no attorney-client privilege in the evidentiary sense. 
This conclusion that the evidentiary privilege was lost, given the 
facts of Himmel, is within the scope of how that privilege has been inter-
preted and applied by some courts. The Illinois Supreme Court noted 
that at some times Forsberg discussed her problems with Himmel while 
Forsberg's mother and her fiancee were present. Because the mother and 
fiancee were not agents of Attorney Himmel, under the Wigmore analy-
sis the information ·communicated is not privileged: Ms. Forsberg was 
making statements to her lawyer in the presence of third parties not nec-
essary for her communication, and their presence meant that this infor-
mation was no longer communicated "in confidence." 53 The court also 
pointed out that, with Ms. Forsberg's consent, Himmel discussed Casey's 
conversion of Forsberg's funds with Casey's insurance company, with the 
insurance company's lawyer, and with Casey himself. The court could 
have also added that there could be no evidentiary privilege regarding 
information communicated in the civil complaint against Casey once that 
complaint, through a court filing, had been made public. 
Himmel, of course, responded to this argument by explaining that 
his client specifically had instructed him not to tell the disciplinary au-
thorities. The court's retort to this argument was rather curt: "A lawyer 
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975), reprinted 
in T. MORGAN & R. RoTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
239, 240 (4th ed. 1987). See genera//y Rotunda, When the Client Lies: Unhelpful Guides from the 
ABA, 1 CORP. L. REV. 34, 39 (1978); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50S. CALL. REV. 809, 837 (1977). 
ABA Formal Opinion 341 interprets "privileged" as used in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (1980). However, the reasoning of Formal Opinion 341 is not limited 
to the term "privileged" as used only in Disciplinary Rule 7-102. Indeed, Formal Opinion 341 
Specifically cites the obligation in MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR l-103 
(1980) to reveal knowledge of misconduct by a judge or lawyer. Formal Opinion 341 concluded: 
"The balancing of the lawyer's duty· to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by 
interpreting the phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1·974 amendment to DR 7-l02(B) as refer-
ring to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101." 
52. ISBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 365 (June 26, 1971), reprinted in 60 ILL. B.J. 
153 (1971). 
53. 125 Ill. 2d at 541-43, 533 N.E.2d at 794. 
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may not choose to circum vent the rules by simply asserting that his client 
asked him to do so."54 The court's argument assumes the point in dis-
pute. Is the client's instruction to the lawyer not to report Casey to the 
disciplinary authorities a request that the ru.les of ethics require the law-
yer to respect? 
For the answer to this question, the court should have discussed its 
own canon 4 in the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. 55 This 
canon, like canon 1 of the Illinois code, is derived from the ABA Model 
Code's Canon 4. Illinois Rule 4-!0l(a) defines the term "confidence" 
and the term "secret." "Confidence" is the attorney-client privilege, as 
recognized under applicable state law, that is, the law of evidence. The 
evidentiary privilege varies from one jurisdiction to another,56 but the 
ethical privilege--the definition of "secret" -is uniform in all states, like 
Illinois, that have adopted the ABA's Disciplinary Rule 4-!0l(A). The 
Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility both define "secret" as "other information 
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be 
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would 
be likely to be detrimental to the client."57 
In this case the client specifically directed the lawyer not to report 
Casey. The client had requested the lawyer to keep secret this informa-
tion, whether or not it was protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Ms. Forsberg's instruction to her attorney is not surprising. She may· 
have concluded that if she or her lawyer made trouble for Casey by re-
porting him to the ARDC, then Casey might lose his interest in settling 
and use up financial resources in defending the ARDC that could have 
been used to reimburse Forsberg. If the client instructs the lawyer not to 
report something to the ARDC for whatever her reasons-whether she is 
embarrassed by the fact that her former lawyer cheated her, whether she 
does not want to involve her former lawyer in any more trouble than 
necessary to get her money back, or whether she does not want to be-
come involved in extensive, time-consuming, and (given her point of 
view) possibly fruitless disciplinary proceedings-Mr. Himmel under ca-
non 4 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility is supposed to 
hold her "secret" inviolate.58 
54. Jd. at 539, 533 N.E.2d at 793. 
55. ILL REV. STAT. ch. !lOA, canon 4 (1987). 
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (19] (1983). 
57. ILL REV. STAT. ch. !lOA, Rule 4~l0l(a) (1987); MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) (1980). 
58. ILL REV. STAT. ch. llDA, Rule 4-JOI(d)(2) (1987) provides that an attorney "may" reveal 
a confidence or secret "when permitted under disciplinary rules or·required by law or court order." 
If that exception were applicable, it would not require the lawyer to reveal, only permit him to 
reveal. More significantly, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, Rule l-103(a) (1987) does not "permit" the 
lawyer to reveal; by its own tenns it excludes from its coverage "privileged" knowledge. In the 
Himmel case, of course, the ARDC could refer to no court order or other law-that is, law other 
than Illinois Disciplinary Rule 1·103(A)-that required Himmel to violate his client's instructions. 
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Prior to filing the complaint against Casey, Himmel's knowledge 
clearly was a "secret" as defined by Illinois Rule 4-!0l(a). After Himmel 
filed the civil complaint in February 1985, the question is much less 
clear, but it is possible that even then the information contained in that 
complaint may not have lost its "secret" status. Once Ms. Forsberg's 
case is filed in a court, her complaint against Casey is "public" in the 
sense that someone could uncover it and read about it. But even after the 
complaint is filed, information about it might still be "secret" in the sense 
that the information has not become "generally known.'' 59 Recall that 
the ARDC denied that Ms. Forsberg had reported Casey to it. When the 
ARDC did proceed against Casey in April 1985, and when Casey was 
subsequently disbarred on consent, it was for matters "unrelated to For-
sberg's claim."60 The ARDC apparently did not argue that the Forsberg 
complaint and civil action against Casey had become "generally known." 
In a busy court system where many cases are filed, Ms. Forsberg's 
judicial action is not necessarily public in the sense that it is front page 
news (or even that it is news buried on page twenty-four). Her case is 
simply one of many cases thrown into an anonymous judicial system. 
Whether it is a federal or state case, even if it reaches verdict, it may (like 
most cases) never reach an appeal and never be immortalized in a pub-
lished decision. Even though the information is "public" in the sense 
that it is not covered by the attorney-client privilege, it is "secret" in the 
sense that knowledge of it is not widely available. The case may remain 
obscure and uncelebrated, not "generally known": that is how the 
American Bar Association uses the word "secret." It states that the 
"ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to 
the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the 
knowledge."61 
Himmel is significant not only because it disciplines a lawyer solely 
for the failure to report (there were no other disciplinary charges filed 
against Mr. Himmel) but primarily because it interprets the word "privi-
leged" in Illinois Rule 1-!03(a) very narrowly and differently than the 
way the ABA uses the very same term in the Model Code. 62 Illinois 
interprets "privileged" in its ethics code to exclude the ethical privilege. 
It is now clear under Illinois law that a lawyer who has knowledge of 
another lawyer's disciplinary violations must report those violations un-
less that knowledge is protected by the very narrow attorney-client evi-
dentiary privilege. Attorneys should now realize that if they fail their 
reporting obligation under Himmel they have no protection based on the 
claim that they were obeying the "secret" requirement of Illinois Rule 4-
lOl(a). 
59. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule LlO comment (3) (1983). 
60. 125 Ill. 2d at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791. 
61. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980); see a/so MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment [5] (1983). 
62. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). 
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Himmel raises many supplementary questions that future courts 
must sort out. The Himmel opinion says that Mr. Himmel had un-
privileged knowledge of Casey's conversions of funds. Of course, Casey 
also had that knowledge. Must he report himself? The answer is not 
entirely clear, but there is evidence that this canon may require a lawyer 
to report himself. Some courts suggest that conclusion. 63 In addition, 
the very language of the relevant rule, which provides that a lawyer pos-
sessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of certain disciplinary rules 
must report that conduct, invites that conclusion. The rule does not say 
a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of another lawyer's violation 
must report. The rule could easily have been drafted to make that point, 
but it was not. 64 
In future cases we might find that when a lawyer is alleged to have 
violated a disciplinary rule, there might be another and extra punishment 
meted out if he did not turn himself in. Of course, an attorney who could 
plead the fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself could not be 
within the reporting requirement of Illinois Rule l-103(a). Not only does 
the fifth amendment override a contrary disciplinary rule, but Illinois 
Rule 1-103(a), by its own terms, exempts from its application "un-
privileged" knowledge. 65 Knowledge protected by the privilege against 
self-incrimination would, therefore, not be protected under the reporting 
rule. Casey, who stole his clients' funds, would have a fifth amendment 
right not to incriminate himself. Ironically, Mr. Himmel is suspended 
from the practice of law for refusing to report Casey, though Casey has a 
constitutional right not to report himself. 
Leaving aside Mr. Casey, what about the insurance company lawyer 
and Casey's lawyer, if Mr. Casey had retained separate counsel? Should 
not these lawyers-if they were members of the Illinois bar-have an 
equal obligation to report? Casey's lawyer is protected by the evidentiary 
privilege to the extent that he received confidential information from his 
client, Mr. Casey. However, recall that Himmel eventually had to file 
suit against Casey. The information that Himmel filed in that complaint 
is not privileged under the law of evidence as to Casey. Nor is anything 
in the defendant's answer privileged under the law of evidence. Because 
the insurance company lawyer represents either Mr. Casey or the insnr-
63. Cf Tallon v. Committee on Professional Standards, 86 A.D.2d 897, 898, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50, 
51 (App. Div. 1982) ("An attorney has a professional duty to promptly notify his client of his failure 
to act and of the possible claim his client may thus have against him."). But see 2 R. MALLEN & J. 
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE§ 19.5, at 162 (3d ed. 1989) ("Notwithstanding mora] considera-
tions," there is "no civil or ethical standard [that] seems to compel" an attorney to disclose his legal 
errors to the client.). Of course, "a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material 
developments in the matters being handled for the client." MoDEL CODE Of PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1980); see a/so MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 {1983). 
64. Jn contrast, MODEL RTJLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983) is drafted differ-
ently. It requires a lawyer to report relevant misconduct of "another lawyer." 
65. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1279 (1973); see also 
Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Disciplinwy Proceedings: Whatever Hap-
pened to Spevak?, 23 VILL L. REV. 127 (1978). 
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ance company (but not Himmel's client, Ms. Forsberg), whatever Mr. 
Himmel told the insurance company lawyer in negotiations is also not 
protected in any way by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The 
insurance company lawyer then should also have the obligation to report 
the charges involving Casey to the disciplinary authorities. Under Him-
mel, when insurance company lawyers acquire "knowledge" of a possible 
disciplinary violation and this knowledge is not privileged under the law 
of evidence, their obligation should be to report it. 
And then, of course, there is the judge, who presided at the trial of 
Forsberg versus Casey. Because this case was brought before a court, a 
judge had to hear the allegations regarding Mr. Casey. The judge is, 
most likely, also a member of the Illinois bar and therefore should be 
subject to Illinois Rule l-103(a). In such a case, the judge should also 
report Mr. Casey. 66 Whether it is a bench trial and whether the jury 
issues a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 67 the judge is made aware that he 
or she does have knowledge of claims against a lawyer. These claims are 
serious indeed, for they involve questions of Casey's honesty and his will-
ingness to convert funds. The court did not discuss these issues regard-
ing a judge's duty to report. But one would think that in the future, 
Illinois judges who are members of the Illinois bar should have an obliga-
tion to report to the ARDC similar to the obligation imposed on Mr. 
Himmel. 
III. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT 
Himmel was a dramatic surprise to the bar68 The supreme court, 
h'!ving made its rule, has given itself a lot to sort out. If lawyers are to be 
suspended for the practice of law, the court should offer clearer guide-
lines describing, for example: (I) to what extent does the reporting rule 
apply to a lawyer who is asked to represent another lawyer accused of 
offenses like fraud or conversion, (2) how soon after the lawyer first 
learns of another lawyer's misconduct must the lawyer file the mandated 
report, (3) to what extent does the lawyer's duty of zealous representa-
tion of the client affect the lawyer's duty to report, especially in cases 
where the reporting might hurt the client's cause of action, and (4) how 
much knowledge must the lawyer acquire before the mandatory duty to 
report is created. These are serious and important issues, and the Illinois 
Supreme Court should discuss them in detail. Preferably, the court will 
proceed by carefully drafted rules; attorneys who have their livelihood on 
the line deserve fair warning rather than after the fact rule making by 
case law. 
66. Since January 1, 1987, an Illinois state judge also has a reporting obligation under ILL 
SUP. CT. R. 63, Canon 3B(3). . . 
67. The jury could render a verdict against the plaintiff on grounds, such as statute of limita~ 
tions, that do not dispute that the lawyer engaged in conversion. 
68. Eg., Middleton, supra note 36. 
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In the meantime, whatever criticisms the decision might draw, one 
important fact is that the court's definition of "privileged communica-
tion" is narrow and clear. After Himmel, we should see a lot more re-
porting of lawyers. In fact, the preliminary empirical evidence already 
suggests that the number of cases in which lawyers report other lawyers 
has gone up. 69 This state of affairs should not be surprising for two rea-
sons. First, most lawyers do obey the law. The good apples still outnum-
ber the bad apples; so if the law says that lawyers must report (even if the 
client instructs them not to report) and the information is not protected 
by the evidentiary privilege, then lawyers will report. Second, many law-
yers who do come across truly serious misconduct by other lawyers want 
to report to the disciplinary authorities. They are normally reluctant, on 
mere suspicion or slight infractions, to raise their fingers and accuse their 
fellow lawyers, but when the action is serious enough and the evidence is 
convincing, the empirical data indicates that lawyers desire to bring cor-
rupt members of the bar to the attention of the disciplinary authorities70 
A rule requiring lawyers to report serves to reduce the internal debate 
between one's desire to weed out the corrupt element from the bar and 
the concern that one must not snitch, squeal, or tattle on a colleague. All 
of these synonyms for "disclose" have pejorative connotations; conse-
quently, a clear duty of mandatory reporting serves to help reduce this 
constant pressure not to report, a pressure reflected in our use of 
language. 71 
However, neither we nor the Illinois Supreme Court should naively 
think that the Himmel decision, by itself, will make any dramatic differ-
ence in lawyer discipline, because the number of lawyers who report is 
not the only bottleneck. The procedures and practices under which the 
Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission operates are an 
equally important bottleneck. If Himmel had reported Casey, either 
before or after Himmel had filed suit against Casey for conversion, there 
is no assurance that the ARDC would have proceeded against Casey 
with any greater dispatch. The main problem is the practice of 
abatement. 
Assume for the moment that Himmel had reported to the ARDC 
the complaints of his client, Ms. Forsberg. Assume, further, that Him-
mel had reported Casey before Himmel filed the civil conversion suit 
against Casey on behalf of Ms. Forsberg. I know of cases where lawyers 
have done that, and the response they receive is not too encouraging. 
The lawyer who is the subject of the report (or the lawyer whom that 
lawyer has retained) may immediately retaliate by claiming that the first 
69. Gross, Legal Ethics/or the Future: Time to Clean Up Our Act?, 77 ILL B.J. 196, 198 n.26 
(1988); Middleton, supra note 36, at 3, coL 3. 
70. See Note, 171e La11yer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 509, 
515-16 (1978). 
71. See generally R. ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE passim (1986). 
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lawyer (the reporting lawyer) is "abusing" the ARDC procedures to ap-
ply "improper pressure" on the allegedly wayward attorney. 
The notion that the ARDC would apply improper pressure on the 
wayward attorney is somewhat less than compelling. Nonetheless, it 
often does seem to muddy the waters when the lawyer who is the subject 
of the report retaliates against the reporting lawyer and claims that the 
reporting lawyer seeks to profit from ARDC action. With the two law-
yers raising charges against each other, we should not be surprised that 
the disciplinary authorities wait until after the original underlying law-
suit is filed; once suit is filed, the disciplinary authorities then wait until 
the results of that suit are final. 
Let us assume, alternatively, that Mr. Himmel reported Casey after 
Himmel had filed a lawsuit against Casey for conversion of Ms. For-
sberg's assets. What would the ARDC have done? Recall the Himmel 
court noted that "(p ]erhaps some members of the public would have been 
spared from Casey's misconduct had respondent reported the informa-
tion as soon as he knew of Casey's conversion of client funds.'m How-
ever, it is quite reasonable to assume that nothing different would have 
happened. If Mr. Himmel had candidly reported Casey to the ARDC, 
and disclosed that his client was about to sue Mr. Casey or had sued 
Casey, nothing would have prevented the ARDC from abating the disci-
plinary proceeding. Illinois, like most states, typically abates disciplinary 
actions when the complainant files a civil action against the attorney. 73 
The practice of abating disciplinary actions, though common, is per-
verse. If the lawyer has engaged in conduct that violates the disciplinary 
rules but does not cause client harm-for example, the lawyer commin-
gles client trust funds but returns the funds with interest so there is no 
harm caused to the client-then the disciplinary authorities may 
promptly proceed with the discipline.74 But if, as in Ms. Forsberg's case, 
the attorney violation is so bad that the client has a legal claim for dam-
ages and the damages are so great that it is worth the expense of litiga-
tion for the client to find another attorney to proceed with a lawsuit, then 
the disciplinary action abates and the lawyer subject to discipline can 
properly announce that he is an active member of the bar "with no disci-
plinary record. " 75 One would think that the preferable alternative is for 
the bar authorities to proceed or, at the very least, to suspend the pro-
72. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 545, 533 N.E.2d at 796. The ARDC administrator specifically 
presented this argument to the court. See id. at 544, 533 N.E.2d at 795 ("[T]he Administrator notes 
that Casey converted many clients' funds after respondent's duty to report Casey arose."). 
73. See, e.g., Weber, "Still in Good Standing:" The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 1987, at 58-59; Rotunda, The Litigator's Responsibility, TRIAL, Mar. 1989, at 98, 100; see also 
telephone conversation with ARDC spokesperson (Mar. 31, 1989). 
74. For an instance in another state where that is exactly what happened, see What Went 
Wrong?-Conversations with Disciplined Lawyers: A Documentary, by Professor Larry Durbin, U, 
of Detroit School of Law (1985) (videotape interviews with several lawyers, one of whom was in this 
situation). 
75. Weber, supra note 73, at 58. 
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ceedings rather than abate them76 But that is not what happens. In 
Himmel it is interesting to note that when the ARDC eventually dis-
barred Casey on consent it did so based on "matters unrelated to For-
sberg's claim. " 77 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Sullivan 78 illustrates the inac-
tion or delayed action relating to the procedures and practices of the 
ARDC. The Seventh Circuit filed its opinion on April 28, 1988. In the 
course of this opinion it stated the following: 
Finally, we were astonished to learn at argument that disciplinary 
proceedings had never been initiated against [Attorney] Sullivan and 
that he remains to this day a lawyer in good standing in the Illinois 
bar, continuing to practice real estate law. Yet the trial of this case 
revealed acknowledged and very serious fraud on his part, for which 
he might well have been prosecuted criminally although he was not. 
(The other three conspirators pleaded guilty to federal criminal 
charges.) And this has been known for many years. We are mailing 
this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 
Commission for such disciplinary action against Sullivan as the 
Commission may deem appropriate.79 
Whether the ARDC knew of Mr. Sullivan's criminal fraud before 
April 28, 1988, it certainly knew of it after that date. On that date three 
Seventh Circuit judges, comprising a unanimous panel, asked the ARDC 
to take action against a lawyer whom they concluded was involved in a 
criminal conspiracy. Mr. Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit ruled, engaged in 
"acknowledged and very serious fraud" and "this has been known for 
many years."80 What has the ARDC done since then? The ARDC has 
the power to act swiftly, and it has the power to seek an interim suspen-
sion if the Inquiry Board of the ARDC votes a complaint charging Mr. 
Sullivan with a code violation involving fraud with "persuasive evidence" 
to support the charge81 
On January 18, 1989, in response to a letter from the ARDC admin-
istrator, I asked what, if anything, the ARDC has done with regard to 
the Sullivan case. As of this date (July 7, 1989), I have received no re-
76. Jt is interesting to note that the government of Great Britain, in a green paper on the 
British legal system, voiced similar complaints. "The possibility of court proceedings should not be 
used as an excuse to prevent or delay making right what has gone wrong, especially when the dam-
age is perfectly clear." LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, THE WORK AND ORGANISATION OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CMND. No. 750, at !8. 
77. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 536, 533 N.E.2d at 791. 
78. 846 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1988). 
79. !d. at 385. 
80. !d. 
81. See, e.g., Mulroy & Palmer, The Illinois Allorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion: Its Structure, Operation, and Limitations, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1186-87 (1987); see also 
id. at 1193-94 ("The ARDC rules reflect an awareness thai disciplinary cases should be handled 
expeditiously. An attorney's fitness to practice law should not be adjudicated three to six years after 
the misconduct is discovered, allowing that attorney to engage in further improper behavior in the 
meantime.") (footnotes omitted). 
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sponse. Yet surely an attorney's "acknowledged and very serious fraud" 
by an attorney continuing to practice law suggests that some sort of pub-
lic discipline may be in order and that the ARDC should act with some 
dispatch. The United States Supreme Court has commented that the 
"glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the federal courts 
and, ultimately, disrespect for the law."82 This litigation glacier may eas-
ily outrun the pace of ARDC proceedings. And, one should add, con-
cerns like those raised by the Sullivan case are no anomaly. 83 
Another problem with ARDC procedures as they work in practice 
is that the outside lawyers who serve as fact finders (i.e.-jurors) for the 
ARDC do not always appear to follow the ARDC's own rules. As one 
member of the ARDC Inquiry Board has noted: 
Although the [ARDC] panel's function is to determine probable 
cause rather than the merits of the case, the panels frequently will 
not vote a complaint unless a majority is persuaded that the respon-
dent has violated the disciplinary code .... Thus, in some cases, a 
panel might close a matter with a self-contradictory letter to the re-
spondent saying, in effect, "We find no probable cause to vote a 
complaint, but don't do it again."84 
The failure of the Inquiry Board to follow its own rules is always an 
unfortunate practice. It is particularly so in these circumstances, for it 
allows an accused attorney, relying on this "self-contradictory letter" to 
represent to the outside world (and to the victim who had complained to 
the ARDC) that the ARDC found no probable cause, so that the accused 
attorney appears to have done nothing wrong. What is supposed to be a 
82. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980). 
83. A recent article in the Chicago Tribune quoted an ARDC member's comments on the 
Himmel case: "If he [Himmel] was a partner at a big firm, like Jenner & Block, nothing would have 
happened." Warren, Possley & Tybor, Supremely Ethical, or An Easy Mark, Chicago Trib., Nov. l, 
1988, § 3, at 3, coL L This remark may illustrate the attitude of some people who make up the 
"Board of Directors" of the ARDC. 
The popular press shares this distrust of, and unhappiness with, the ARDC. For example, a 
recent editorial complained of the Doss case: 
Doss finally surrendered his law license . . but those close to the case say the state Supreme 
Court Registration and Discipline Commission, the agency charged with weeding unfit lawyers 
from practice, never conducted a real investigation of the case. Despite serious complaints 
about Doss' conduct that date back nearly a decade, he never was ordered to cease the practice 
of law. 
Foreman, Justice In Doss Case Isn't Blind, Just Lame, Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, Oct 25, 
1988, at A4 (editorial). Doss stole $2.5 million from his client, Mr. Eugene Bloomingdale, and then 
lied to conceal it. .He was convicted of perjury and, in 1989, sentenced to 30 months probation. 
Dey, Doss' Poor Health Yields Sentence of Confinement, Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, Jan. 18, 
1989, at AI, cols. 5-6. Doss cheated Mr. Bloomingdale out of his money in 1973. Mr. Blooming-
dale's widow now lives with her mother because she has extensive bills and she does not ''have 
anyplace else to live." !d. at p. A!O, col. 6. 
After all of these years, "Doss has served not one day in jail, done not one hour of public 
service, paid not one penny in llnes and paid exactly none of the $2.5 million he owes Eugene Bloom-
ingdale." Foreman, supra, at A4. 
84. Mulroy & Palmer, The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission: Its 
Structure, Operation, and Limitations, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181, 1192 (1987) (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis added). One of the authors of this article is a member of the ARDC Inquiry Board. 
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discipline proceeding instituted to protect the public becomes a white-
wash, a vindication of the accused, a decision by the ARDC that the 
charges against the accused did not even rise to the level of probable 
cause. The ARDC, an institution designed to protect the public, is used 
by the lawyer to protect his or her misconduct. 
Trial lawyers often say that they do not want members of the bar to 
be on juries. The concern is that jurors who are also lawyers are more 
likely to ignore the judge's instructions and take the law into their own 
hands. Perhaps some of the lawyers on the ARDC panels are only doing 
what comes naturally when they send this "self-contradictory letter." If 
so, the Illinois Supreme Court should consider revamping the entire sys-
tem and treat disciplinary complaints like civil cases, where the ARDC 
presents its case to a real judge and a jury of lay people. 85 Then, public 
scrutiny of such proceedings, open to the public and not held behind 
closed doors, 86 will serve as an independent check of the fairness of attor-
ney discipline procedures. Such a proposal is hardly radical; several 
states already have opened discipline procedures to the public and, con-
trary to the expectations of the opponents of such reform, the sky has not 
fallen 87 
85. The ABA has recommended that one-third of the statewide agencies on discipline should 
be nonlawyer, public members, with a lawyer as chairperson. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER Drs-
Cll'LJNE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 3.4 (Feb. 1979). Bu,;E RIBBON COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
THE FUNCTIONS AND 0PERATl0NS OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COM-
MISSION, fiNAL REPORT (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], recommended that non]awyers 
be placed on the Inquiry Board. !d. at 6, 18-22. The National Organization of Bar Counsel bas also 
recommended that nonlawyers be involved in the disciplinary process at all levels. Woytash, It's 
Time To Do Something About Lawyer Competence, 64 A.B.A. J. 308 (1978). 
However, to have some lay members and yet to have the fact finding controlled by lawyer 
members is tinkering with the system rather than reforming it. 
ln Great Britain as well, the government has determined that there should be stronger and more 
effective lay control over the machinery of discipline of attorneys. In its green paper, the govern-
ment proposes to authorize the lord chancellor to appoint a "Legal Services Ombudsman" with 
broad powers, much broader than the "office of Lay Observer," which the ombudsman will replace. 
The new ombudsman will have power: to examine the way lawyers have handled complaints 
brought against them; to reinvestigate cases; to refer cases back to the disciplinary tribunal; to rec-
ommend that the relevant professional legal body pay compensation; to recommend improvements 
to the discipline procedure; and to "publicise his decisions." LORD CHANCELLOR's DEPARTMENT, 
THE WORK AND 0RGANISAT10N OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CMND. NO. 570, at 18. The 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 5, also noted: "There is mistrust of the Illinois disciplinary system 
because it is conducted in secret." 
86. The American Bar Associa1ion recommends that prior to the filing and service of formal 
discipline charges, the proceedings should be confidential (unless the respondent has waived confi-
dentiality, the proceeding is based on the conviction of a crime, or the proceeding is based on allega-
tions that have become generally known to the public). ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER 
DlSCIPLJNE AND DJSABILJTY PROCEEDlNGS § 8.25 (1979). Then, the proceedings should be open to 
the public, "[U]pon the filing and service of formal charges the proceedings should be public, except 
for: (a) deliberations of the hearing committee, board or court; and (b) information with respect to 
which the hearing committee has issued a protective order." !d. 
87. See Moya, The Doors Stay Shut on Discipline, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 4, & 12, 
col. 1. Proponents of open procedures note that there is "no reason for protecting lawyers' privacy 
in disciplinary proceedings when no similar protective measures exist for laymen charged with 
crime." !d. at 12, col. 4. It is much more serious to be charged with a crime than with a discipline 
violation, and the person charged with a crime is subject to discipline procedures even though we 
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know he or she may ultimately be acquitted. The FINAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 44, recommends 
that the discipline proceedings should be public "upon the filing and service of formal charges" 
except for "(a) deliberations of the Hearing Panel, Review Board or Court; and (b) information with 
respect to which the Hearing Panel has issued a protective order (including information protected by 
the attorney-client privilege.") 
